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sion to this view.24 Five other cases give support to the majority.25
"Respondeat superior" is commonly said to be founded upon the
policy, ". . that every man, in the management of his own affairs,
whether by himself or by his agents or servants, shall so conduct them
as not to injure another; and if he does not, and another thereby sus-
tains damage, he shall answer for it."126 It is submitted that it is dif-
ficult to see why the absence of an instrumentality should delimit this
policy.2 7 The logic of the case seems undisputable.
MASTER AND SERVANT
"PORTAL TO PORTAL" TIME CONSTITUTES WORK UNDER THE
FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT.
Plaintiff iron ore company brought action against the defendant
miners' union for a declaratory judgment that miners' travel time, (a)
in the shafts, (b) getting to and from the actual face of the iron ore,
and (c) time spent at the surface in obtaining and returning tools,
checking in and out etc., should not be counted in the work week as
24. In Tighe v. Ad Chong et al., 44 Cal. App. (2d) 164, 112 P. (2d)
20 (1941), cited supra note 22, where a delivery boy negligently
bumped into and injured the plaintiff, the California Supreme
Court, in disavowing the principle of the Missouri cases and fol-
lowing the Schediwy case, held that the negligent operation of
some instrumentality was not essential in invoking "respondeat
superior." "Quite to the contrary, the law is well settled that in
determining the question of respondeat superior the real test to
be applied is whether at the time the employee commits the
negligent act resulting in the injuries to the third person, he is
engaged in performing some duty within the scope of his em-
ployment." Id. at 22. However, it should be noted that the court
attempts to distinguish the Missouri cases upon the grounds that
in those cases the injury was the result of "rollicking" by the
servant. In Hobba et ux. v. Postal Telegraph Co., - Wash. - ,
141 P. (2d) 648 (1943), cited supra note 23, where the facts were
very similar to those of the Phillips case, the Washington Supreme
Court said that you would probably feel that you should make some
distinction between those cases where the employee uses some in-
strumentality and where the employee travels on foot. However,
the court continued by saying, "If the employer chooses to have
the work done by another, he must be held responsible to others
for the negligent conduct of his employee while doing the work,
or else he should do the work himself. We think that if we try
to draw a distinction between the different methods of locomotion
that might result in injury to others, we not only misapply the
doctrine of respondeat superior, but also forsake it entirely." Id.
at 651.
25. See Cook v. Sanger, 110 Cal. App. 293, 293 Pac. 794, 800 (1930);
Phillip Ryan v. Patrick F. Keane, 211 Mass. 543, 98 N. E. 590
(1912); Phillips v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 194 Mo. App. 458,
184 S. W. 958 (1916); Price v. Simon, 62 N.J.L. 151, 40 Atl. 689(1898); Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v. Edwards, 22 Tex. Civ. App. 184,
67 S. W. 891 (1902). See also (1944) 32 Geo. L. J. 308.
26. Nicholas Farwell v. Boston & Worcester R. R., 4 Metc. 49, 55, 56
(Mass. 1842).
27. See (1944) 32 Geo. L. J. 308.
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NOTES AND COMMENTS
defined for overtime purposes under the Fair Labor S ;andards Act.'
A judgment of the district court 2 in favor of the defenda nts was modi-
fied3 as to the time spent checking in and out and affirmed as to time
spent from "portal to portal." 4 Rehearing was denied' and plaintiffs
brought certiorari. Held, affirmed. Time spent in traveling under-
ground to and from the working face constituted work ,ir employment
for which compensation must be paid under the Fair Lsbor Standards
Act. Tennessee Coal, Iron and Railroad Co. v. Muscoda Local Number
123, etc. et al., 64 Sup. Ct. 698 (1944). (Chief Justice Stone and Justice
Roberts dissenting.)
This is a problem of construction of the Fair Labor Standards Act
of 1938,0 and the common law rules governing the master-servant rela-
tionship are not applicable to situations which fall within the ambit of
this legislation.7 The primary goal of Congress was that persons should
not be permitted to take part in interstate commerce while working un-
der sub-standard labor conditions.$ If overtime pay might have the
effect of protecting commerce from the injurious results of goods pro-
duced under sub-standard conditions, labor contracts made before or
after such legislation cannot take these overtime transactions from the
jurisdiction of the statute.9
Upon facts very similar to the instant case, the Sanshine case' 0
held that minors of silver ore were entitled to "portal to portal" pay,
although the time spent in travel was in cages which were readily
lowered and hoisted, and not in uncomfortable and dangerous ore
skips"I as in the principal case. However, it is to -be noted that the
court in the Sunshine case appeared to be greatly influ enced by the
fact that the miners were "within the scope of emplo.ynent" in de-
1. Fair Labor Standards Act, 52 Stat. 1060, 1063, 29 U.S.C.A. §§203
(g,j,), 207 (a,3), (1938).
2. Tennessee Coal, Iron & Railroad Company v. Muscoda Local No.
123, 40 F. Supp. 4 (N.D. Ala. 1941).
3. Tennessee Coal, Iron & Railroad Company v. Muscoda Local No.
123, 135 F. (2d) 320 (C.C.A. 5th, 1943).
4. The "portal to portal" basis of pay, proposed by the respondents,
includes time spent in traveling between the entronce or portal
to the mine and the working face and the reutrn tiip, as well as
the time spent at the actual working face of the ore
5. Tennessee Coal, Iron & Railroad Company v. Muscoda Local No.
123, 137 F. (2d) 176 (C.C.A. 5th, 1943).
6. The Fair Labor Standards Act is a regulatory statute designed to
implement a public, social, or economic policy through remedies
often in derogation of the common law. Walling v. American
Needlecraft, 139 F. (2d) 60 (C.C.A. 6th, 1943).
7. Walling v. American Needlecraft, 139 F. (2d) 60, 63 (C.C.A. 6th,
1943), sited supra note 6.
8. United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100, 115 (1941).
9. Overnight Motor Transport Company v. Missel, 316 U. S. 572, 577(1942).
10. Sunshine Mining Company v. Carver, 41 F. Supp. 60 (Idaho 1941).
11. An ore skip is an ordinary four-wheeled ore box car. It is normally
used in transporting ore and its floor is often covered with muck
from such use. When men ride in it, it is called a "man skip trip."
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
ciding that travel time was hours worked.12 It appears that there is a
difference between actually working and being in the scope of em-
ployment. This court, in fact, decided that the miners' lunchtime was
not hours worked, yet it has been almost uniformily held that a work-
man in a like situation was "within the scope of employment.' 13
Since many borderline cases have purportedly turned on the very
few words appearing in the Fair Labor Standards Act, §207 (a) (3),14
it is not surprising that opposite results have been reached. In the
case of auxiliary firemen, time spent at the fire hall in recreation while
subject to call has been held not to be "work."'15 In a similar situation
another court held that such time was "work," 1 distinguishing the
cases on the ground that in the first-mentioned case the parties agreed
to special separate pay in case of a fire call."7
12. The court at 66 cited Bountiful Brick Co. v. Giles, 275 U.S. 154
(1928) and quoted from it: "The employment may begin in point
of time before the work is entered upon and in point of space be-
fore the place where the work is to be done is reached. Probably,
as a general rule, employment may be said to begin when the em-
ployee reaches the entrance of the employer's premises where the
work is to be done; but it is clear that in some cases the rule ex-
tends to include adjacent premises used by the employee as a
means of ingress and egress with the express or implied consent
of the employer."
13. Employer's Mutual Insurance Co. v. Industrial Commission of
Colorado, 76 Colo. 84, 230 P. 394 (1924); Bollard v. Engel, 4 N.Y.S.(2d) 363, 254 App. Div. 162 (1938); White v. E. L. Slattery Co.,
236 Mass. 28, 127 N.E. 597 (1920); Thomas v. Proctor and Gamble
Mfg. Co., 104 Kan. 432, 179 P. 372 (1919).
14. What did Congress mean when it said in the Fair Labor Standards
Act, "No employer shall . . . employe any of his employees . . .
for a workweek longer than forty hours . . .unless such employee
receives compensation" for overtime at a specific rate?
15. Skidmore et al. v. Swift and Co., 136 F. (2d) 112 (C.C.A. 5th,
1943).
16. Wantock at al. v. Armour and Co., 140 F. (2d) 356 (C.C.A. 7th,
1944).
17. The court at 357 expressed its uncertainty as to whether or not
the distinction between the two cases was material by saying:
"It seems to us that the question is one which only the court
of last resort can answer finally, and our conclusion affords but
a resting place, as it were, for the passage of this question on its
flight from the court of original jurisdiction to the Supreme
Court." The fact that the employer furnished the means of trans-
portation would not appear to make the time spent in travel "time
worked" since, when the employer furnished a motor boat to ride
employees to and from that place of work, it was not "time work-
ed." Bulot et al. v. Freeport Sulphur Co., 45 F. Supp. 380 (E.D.
Louisiana 1942). Opposite results have been reached in the case of
oil pumpers as to whether time spent when subject to call is time
worked. In the case holding that it was time worked, the de-
cision was based on the pumper's obligation to carry out his re-
sponsibility. Fleming v. Rex Oil and Gas Co., 43 F. Supp. 951
(W.D. Michigan 1941). In the other case he was entitled to pay
only for time actually worked. Thompson v. Loring Oil Co., 50 F.
Supp. 213 (W.D. Louisiana 1943). A porter who was required to
sleep on the premises was held not entitled to overtime compensa-
tion when, in the course of ordinary events, he was indulging in
relaxation and entirely private pursuits. Muldowney v. Seaberg
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In the case of coal miners a different holding than that of the
instant case is to be noted. Bituminous coal miners' travel-time has
been held not to be work-time under the statute.18 The coal miners
ride in "man-trips" which are slightly larger than those used by ore-
miners. 1D The supervision during the trip would appear to be about the
same. Both groups find it necessary to bend over where the roof is low.
It does not appear reasonable that the difference in difficulty of travel
should lead to the distinction between hours worked and non-hours
worked. As a practical matter the decision in the instant case will
operate by way of sudden penalty in that the employor will not only
be forced to pay for all back time in travel, but also to pay at the rate
of time and one-half.2o Older mines, whose travel time amounts to
one and one-half hours daily, can hardly meet the competitive situa-
tion.21 Due to the peculiar travel situation and labor shortage a re-
duction in hours and a spread of employment would appear imprac-
tical, and thus two of the intended ends of the Fair Labor Standards
Act2 2 are thwarted.
In the face of these disadvantageous reactions ard the opposing
prior decisions, it is submitted that the court found a matter of public
policy to be controlling. An excerpt from the brief of counsel for the
ore miners might reveal this policy: "In coal mining we find a union
which has been strong and powerful and which as a union has been
engaged in collective bargaining with the coal operato rs over a long
period of years. In our case we find the efforts of the men to organize
their union presents a pitiable picture of helplessness against the
domination of the mining companies. ' 23 Noting that the court said,
"But these provisions, like the other portions of the Fair Labor Stand-
ards Act, are remedial and humanitarian in purpose, '24 might strength-
en this conclusion. In perfect harmony with this reasoning is the fact
that the coal miners, through collective bargaining ogreements, are
now receiving "portal to portal" pay.
Elevator Co., 39 F. Supp. 275 (E.D. New York 1941). Radio engi-
neers are entitled to compensation for periods on duty between
half-hourly readings of meters while they are responsible for the
operation of the equipment in their charge. Walling v. Sun Pub-
lishing Co., 47 F. Supp. 180 (W.D. Tennessee 1942).
18. Jewell Ridge Coal Corporation v. Local No. 6167, United Mine
Workers of America, 53 F. Supp. 935 (Virginia 1914).
19. Man-trips used by the coal miners are about twelve feet long and
seven feet wide. Not more than eight men riding in these cars
ordinarily sit on a bench furnished for that purpose or, where the
ceiling of the shaft is low, in the bottom of the car. Man-trips
used by ore miners are about eight feet long and ten men ride
on each one.
20. See Mr. Justice Sibley dissenting in Tennessee Coal Iron and Rail-
road Company v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 135 F. (2d) 320, 323.
21. Ibid.
22. Overnight Motor Transport Co. v. Missel, 316 U. S. 573, 576 (1942).
23. Judge Barksdale was quoting from the brief of counsel for the
ore miners in the principal case in Jewell Ridge Coal Corporation
v. Local No. 6167, United Mine Workers of America, 53 F. Supp.
935, 948 (Virginia 1944).
24. Instant case at 703.
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